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ABSTRACT 
This paper explores the nexus between efforts of the European Union in promotion of the 
rule of law in Ukraine and the domestic factors limiting the successful introduction and 
consolidation of this democratic norm. By moving beyond legalistic understanding of the 
rule of law and highlighting the political and cultural nature of reform, it examines the 
domestic root causes and outlines the power structures and existing norms as under-
studied, yet crucial building stones for the successful implementation of the rule of law. 
Firstly, it argues that incomplete consolidation of democratic institutions resulting in 
predominance of power vertical and alternative power structures of oligarchic clans 
undermine the authority of the rule of law. Secondly, it highlights the role of normative 
friction between the rule of law and domestic normative environment in Ukraine, 
influenced by the Soviet legacy and neo-patrimonial values. This has broad implications 
not only for understanding the limits of progress in the rule of law in Ukraine, but also of 
the efforts of external actors, such as the EU, to advance the rule-of law reform in this 
region.  
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INTRODUCTION 
For almost two decades, the EU has endeavoured to support the development of 
core democratic norms in Ukraine. The history and the scope of relations with the 
EU, from both political and economic perspective, as well as the foreign orientation 
of Ukraine towards Europe have provided the EU with strategic leverage over the 
domestic political development in Ukraine (Kuzio, 2001). The scope for the EU’s 
normative pressure has been increasing – the EU has incorporated democratic 
norms, including the rule of law, among the main principles of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (2004), the EU-Ukraine Action Plan (2005), the Visa 
Liberalisation Action Plan (2007) and the Association Agreement (2014). It has 
cooperated with other international institutions (especially the Council of Europe, 
OSCE, USAID) in promoting the rule of law via diplomatic, financial or political 
means.  
Nevertheless, it has been only partly able to trigger actual compliance of 
Ukrainian authorities with the rule of law. The protracted democratic transition 
led to mixed results – while many key rule-of-law institutions were established 
and laws adopted, the effective implementation has been lagging behind, 
leaving malign deficiencies in numerous domains of Ukrainian state, society and 
economy. This paper seeks to understand this divide by looking at the domestic 
structural factors influencing the effective implementation of the rule of law. It 
adopts the end-based definition of the rule of law that shifts beyond legalistic and 
institution-based analysis focused on attributes of relevant rule-of-law institutions 
(such as effective judiciary, well-trained lawyers, non-corrupt police). This move is 
underpinned by the realisation that the institution-based understanding of the 
rule of law limits the conceptual space for treating it as a fundamentally cultural 
or political problem (Kleinfeld, 2012). The end-based definition concentrates on 
the ends the rule of law brings to the society, namely the government bound by 
and ruled by law, equality before the law, establishment of law and order, 
efficient and predictable application of justice, and protection of human rights 
(Kleinfeld, 2005). This allows adopting a more comprehensive perspective on the 
development of the rule of law, integrating the power structures and socio-
cultural realities as essential building blocks of effective rule of law. 
The paper is informed mainly by the literature on norm diffusion, rule of law 
promotion and Ukraine’s democratisation (Burlyuk, 2015; Checkel, 1997, 1999; 
Kleinfeld 2005, 2012; Natorski, 2013). It relies on data from global indexes, 
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national public opinion polls, surveys and includes interviews with experts on 
Ukrainian democratic reforms conducted by the author in Kiev during August 2016. 
 
 
PROTRACTED DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION IN UKRAINE:  
SETTING THE SCENE 
Among the countries of the Eastern Partnership (EaP), Ukraine has been considered 
the test case for the success of EU’s democracy promotion beyond its borders. 
The European integration has been among Ukraine’s top foreign policy priorities 
consistently since the late 1990s, despite changes in the political leadership in the 
country. The EU was perceived not only a source of Ukraine’s modernisation and 
economic prosperity, but it was equally a natural ‘civilizational’ choice for the 
emerging post-soviet country, exemplified by the narrative of ‘return to Europe’ 
based on extensive mutual historical and cultural relations. From the EaP countries, 
Ukraine was the first to sign the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) 
with the EU in 1994. In 1998, Ukraine expressed the intention to become a 
member of the EU (Balfour, 2011), started negotiations on Association Agreement 
(AA) with the EU in 2007 and the visa liberalisation dialogue in 2008. Especially 
during Viktor Yushchenko’s presidency after the Orange revolution (2005–2010), 
Ukraine has achieved significant progress in the democratic performance, showing 
comparatively better results than other former soviet countries (Freedom House, 
2016).  
However, initial hopes for Ukraine as a regional frontrunner have been under-
mined by two-fold deterioration of democracy. Firstly, under president Kuchma 
(1994–2004), who consolidated his power excessively in the last years of his rule. 
High expectations of the subsequent Orange revolution, which brought the end 
of his authoritarian rule and a turn back to democracy were, however, thwarted 
after Viktor Yanukovych got the presidential power in 2010 and resumed 
authoritarian tendencies again. Thus, despite positive signs of developments and 
two democratic openings (2004, 2014), Ukraine’s European ambitions have not 
been translated into the clear-cut and sustainable progress towards democracy 
(Popescu, 2015; Wolczuk, 2004; Wolczuk, 2009). The integration based on 
‘declarative Europeanisation’ has remained limited to foreign policy statements, 
and did not bring concrete structural changes into domestic politics (Wolczuk, 
2004). Even reform efforts reinvigorated after the Revolution of Dignity have 
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received criticism for being limited to the legal changes and neglecting the 
effective implementation that would lead to real transformation. 
The current state of affairs in Ukraine indeed does not show fundamental 
progress in the rule of law. Various international global rankings coincidentally 
observe low standards of compliance with the rule of law practices. Ukraine 
occupied 78th place globally in the Rule of Law index in 2016, displaying weak 
results especially in the constraints on government powers, absence of 
corruption, regulatory enforcement, and civil and criminal justice (WJP, 2016). 
According to the Nations in Transit, the state of judicial framework and 
independence has constantly deteriorated from 2006 and the corruption has 
predominated on the highest political level (Shusko and Prystayko, 2015). In 2015, 
Transparency International ranked Ukraine on 130th place among 168 countries 
evaluated in Corruption perception index (TI, 2015). Deficiencies in the rule of law 
are reported also on the national level by Ukrainian citizens who display 
extremely low levels of trust towards public institutions, especially to the law 
enforcement institutions. According to the opinion poll from 2015, 71% of 
Ukrainians do not trust the judiciary, and 81% do not trust the courts (CPLR, 
2015). The majority of Ukrainians identify the following negative phenomena in 
the courts: corruption (94%), judges dependent on politicians (80.5%) and 
oligarchs (80%), adoption of imposed judgements (77%), mutual cover-up in the 
justice system (73%), low level of morality in the majority of judges (66%), lack of 
clarity and transparency of judicial processes for the ordinary citizens (52%), and 
complicated nature of judicial system (50.5%) (Ibid.) 
Improving the rule of law has been one of the main demands of the Revolution 
of Dignity and many Ukrainians consider corruption the biggest threat to national 
security (Bychenko, 2015). Still, it seems to be one of the most resistant among 
the democratic norms in Ukraine. The changes are under way formally (for 
example, a complex anti-corruption package was adopted in 2015, constitutional 
amendment regarding the judiciary in 2016), the actual compliance, however, 
remains poor. Burlyuk (2015) identifies two paradoxes in the rule of law in 
Ukraine: the façade arrangement paradox indicating the shallowness of the reform 
despite existing constitutional and legal provisions and the Brownian motion 
paradox, describing the numerous steps taken for the reform, without much 
substantial progress. While the laws and institutions are a necessary condition, 
they are not sufficient for the actual compliance with the rule of law in Ukraine.  
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PARADIGM SHIFT IN STUDYING THE RULE OF LAW IN UKRAINE:  
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE 
The rule of law in Ukraine has been trapped between two gaps: on the one hand, 
the gap between efforts of external actors to promote the rule of law and lack of 
results on the ground; on the other, the divide between formal legal and 
institutional compliance and lack of effective implementation. In order to explain 
these phenomena, the sociological and neo-institutionalist approaches underline 
that it is power and culture, not (only) laws and institutions, that form the roots of 
a state guided by the principle of the rule of law (Burlyuk, 2015; Kleinfeld, 2012; 
Natorski, 2013). This bears two implications for the understanding of the develop-
ment of the rule of law.  
Firstly, the underlying premise of the rule of law is essentially about limiting 
the power of the state, while it is the government itself who must take the 
necessary measures (Kleinfeld, 2012). It therefore challenges the power of the 
powerful and touches upon the established power structures within the state and 
business. According to one interviewee, substituting the rule of man by the rule 
of law means the ‘need to change the entire power structure of the country’1, which 
inevitably meets opposition and obstruction from political and economic elites. 
Carothers (1998) claims that the main obstacles to the rule of law are not technical 
or financial, but rather political and human, pointing to the fundamental problem 
of leaders who refuse to be ruled by the law. Similarly, Kleinfeld (2012) asserts that 
the failing institutions are not the cause of rule-of-law deficiencies, but rather 
symptoms of a power structure that does not support the rule of law.  
Secondly, the rule of law is largely a question of norms and culture, which 
determine the relation between the state and the society and between citizens 
themselves. It is argued that ‘transformation and systemic change is something that 
is only to a limited extent a matter of law-making’ (Elster et al, 1998: 18). By contrast, 
it is cultural patterns, identities, legacies, and practices entrenched in the ‘habits 
of the hearts’ and ‘frames of mind’ of masses and elites that need to be changed 
(Ibid.). Mueller (2010) suggests that the tension between practices and institutions 
is a starting point to understand the transformation of post-communist countries. 
Every country has specific socio-cultural and state-society relations determining 
                                                                                                                                       
1  Interview with an UNDP official, Kyiv, 22 August 2016. 
8 
the ‘adoption environment’ or ‘domestic structure’ for the rule of law (Checkel 
1997; 1999). Börzel and Risse (2000) therefore assert that in order to understand the 
compliance with a norm, it is necessary to understand the potential normative or 
cognitive misfit between European and domestic norms in a third country.  
Besides the scholarship on the norm promotion and rule of law promotion, 
interviewed practitioners from the field also mention the centrality of power and 
norms in understanding the rule of law in Ukraine. The next section therefore 
proposes a framework to study these two factors and briefly presents examples of 
domestic obstacles to the implementation of the rule of law in Ukraine at the 
level of power structures and social norms. 
 
 
POWER STRUCTURES: POWER VERTICAL THROUGH  
INSUFFICIENTLY CONSOLIDATED INSTITUTIONS 
The rule of law might be effectively implemented only when ‘the powerful’ 
accept limits on their power and submit to equality under the law (Kleinfeld, 
2012: 93). As highlighted by Miklos (2016), current reforms in Ukraine are ‘not a 
technical, but rather a political problem’ requiring the leadership, ownership and 
effective communication of the government. The determination of the political 
leaders can make a difference, as demonstrated by different patterns and out-
comes of anti-corruption efforts in Georgia and Ukraine (Kupatadze, 2011). 
However, the political will needs to be complemented by studying deeper, long-
lasting power structures that determine leaders’ behaviour and attitude to 
reforms. Therefore, the research of formal but also informal institutions is 
necessary to find out where and how the power structures are entrenched. 
With regards to formal political institutions, the crucial precondition for the 
effective rule of law is the consolidation of political institutions in both vertical and 
horizontal dimension so that the rules and laws can operate; and an effective 
system of checks and balances ensuring accountability of the state institutions. 
While the vertical consolidation enables all decisions to take place under 
accepted rules, horizontal consolidation guarantees that every decision is made 
within specific domains of action, without interference from other domains (Elster 
et al., 1998). In the first place, the acceptance of the rules of the game in the 
vertical dimension suggests that the decision-makers and political stakeholders 
are capable of self-control and agree to perform their duties according to rules 
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defining their position (for instance, according to the scope of rights and 
obligations of the president established by the constitution). Secondly, it means 
that in case of non-compliance, the actors are prepared to accept the rules of a 
higher authority such as the courts (Ibid). The horizontal dimension as a second 
criterion for the consolidated democratic institutions requires the separation of 
power into institutional spheres capable of performing their functions, indepen-
dent of each other and free from the dictate from agents from other spheres 
(Ibid). In a similar vein, Kleinfeld (2012) highlights the need of structures of 
accountability that serve to check and balance different power sources both 
horizontally and vertically. While the horizontal limits relate to the division of 
power among state institutions, her understanding of vertical dimension relates 
to the question how power is distributed between the state and the society, and 
what checks and balances operate outside the state power (citizens, media, or 
culture). Given these preconditions, three criteria are established to evaluate the 
‘adoption environment’ for the rule of law in Ukraine: (1) Division of power and 
structure of checks and balances, (2) Acceptance of rules by state institutions 
(3) Vertical checks and balances.2  
 
 
Blended constitutional powers  
To ensure the division of powers in the democratic state, the judiciary and 
legislature should be independent and able to exercise effective checks on the 
government. In this light, the incomplete division of power and the strong 
presidency in Ukraine3 seem to be inherently problematic for the establishment 
of the democratic norms, including the rule of law (D’Anieri, 2006). It affects not 
only the independence of institutional domains, but also distorts the rules 
according to which they operate. Vast powers of the president in the presidential 
                                                                                                                                       
2  These dimensions are covered complexly by the Rule of Law index by the World Justice Project. In 
factor ‘Constrains on Government powers’, it evaluates the extent that government powers are (1) 
limited by the legislature, (2) limited by the judiciary, (3) limited by independent auditing and 
review, (4) sanctioned for misconduct of its officials, (5) subjected to non-governmental checks 
and whether (6) transition of power is subject to the law (WJP, 2016a).  
3  Even though the academic literature does not make a definitive statement about the benefits of 
presidential or parliamentary system for democracy (Averchuk, 2016), Aslund (2009) argues that 
all post-communist countries that kept the presidential system actually turned into authoritarian 
regimes (with the exception of Georgia) (see also Myerson, Roland & Mylovanov, 2016). 
10 
system, which has been in place for the most of the time since Ukraine’s 
independence, have been misused during the last years of Kuchma’s presidency 
(1994–2004) as well as during Yanukovych’s rule (2010–2013). Rising authoritarian 
rule resulted in restrictions of institutional checks and balances, especially the 
judiciary and law-enforcement agencies necessary for safeguarding fundamental 
freedoms and the rule of law. Additionally, even though Ukraine currently has a 
mixed parliamentary-presidential system, the confounding of powers between 
the Prime Minister and the President creates many opportunities of political in-
fighting and causes unclear accountability (Myerson et al, 2016). This was 
exemplary during the presidency of Viktor Yushchenko in the Orange period, 
whose rule did not bring expected results due to power struggles with Prime 
Minister Yulia Tymoshenko. Therefore, unless the division between competences 
of the president and the government within the executive branch is clear, the 
system is prone to intra-executive conflict and competition, which hampers the 
potential of reform processes.  
 
 
The rule of law vs. rule of patrons 
The second problem of Ukrainian politics, which poses obstacles to consolidation 
of the rule of law, is the so-called ‘oligarchisation of power’. This designates 
conditions where instead of predictable political agenda, the domestic political 
life is de facto dominated by oligarchs and their interests. The powerful financial-
political groups exercise strong influence on politics and economy in the country 
through their links with the business, political parties that they own, judges, or 
media holdings. This enables them to advocate for private interests and to 
become an integral part of the power system (Minakov, 2016). In a situation of 
close interconnection of politics with the business, oligarchs create an alternative 
system of accountability for the relevant actors (be it government and legislature 
officials, judges, police or military service), meaning that the constitutional rules 
(of law) are bypassed and substituted by the rule of the ‘patrons’. So far, the 
oligarchic pacts have strongly undermined Ukraine’s ability to deliver the genuine 
reforms by creating informal arrangements distorting the work of the formal 
institutions and by monopolistic appropriation of public, political, and economic 
functions. The ‘oligarchic neo-patrimonial system’ (Fisun, 2012) has broad 
economic roots and consequences. Nurtured by the institutional setup after the 
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fall of communism, it has allowed the former Soviet-era elite to extract 
considerable rent-seeking benefits by controlling the executive agencies of the 
state (Wolczuk, 2004). The oligarchs are considered as primary veto players who 
prefer preserving the status quo or conceding only to changes for their own 
benefit (Burlyuk, 2015), as the effective implementation of the rule of law and the 
reform of judiciary and prosecutor office would directly threaten their business 
and rent extraction (Lough & Solonenko, 2016).4 This leads to absence of political 
will of ruling political and business elites to support legal and practical progress in 
the rule of law.  
 
State vs. civil society 
Another factor explaining the viability of the rule-of-law reform in the domestic 
environment is the extent to which the Ukrainian state allows for vertical control 
of its actions by the non-state actors, such as the civil society and media. This is 
determined by the broader setting of state-society relations and the nature of the 
regime – the more liberal it is, the more the role of elites is constrained, and the 
more space there is for societal pressure and advocacy (Checkel, 1997). Contrarily, 
the authoritarian regime allows significantly smaller room for the society to 
control and keep the respective institutions accountable; the decision about 
compliance to the norm rests entirely within the elite and its power interest 
(Checkel, 1997, 1999; Schimmelfennig et al, 2006). Ukraine has gone through both 
types of regimes and their gradations – while very much constrained during the 
rule of Kuchma and Yanukovych, the civil society enjoyed more freedom under 
president Yushchenko. Since the Revolution of Dignity, the Ukrainian civil society 
has consolidated yet again and represents a strong ‘norm-entrepreneur’ 
favouring democratic norms such as transparency, accountability and the rule of 
law. Similarly, the media became more active in displaying the corruption 
practices of public officials and links between politics and oligarchs (Lough & 
Solonenko, 2016). The civil society and media thus constitute a potentially strong 
watchdog of state institutions. During two democratic openings in Ukraine – the 
                                                                                                                                       
4  Despite the fact that the assets of the wealthiest oligarchs decreased significantly from 2014 to 
2015 due to the conflict with Russia and economic crisis, the oligarchic system has not been 
completely dismantled and still controls the economy and main television channels in the country 
(Jarabik & Bila, 2015). 
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Orange revolution in 2004 and the Revolution of Dignity in 2013, the civil society 
actors played the role of a spokesperson of popular demands to establish the rule 
of law and accountability of political leaders. Current joint efforts of experts and 
non-governmental organisations keep the government and the parliament 
accountable in adopting and implementation of the judicial and anti-corruption 
reforms.5 However, there are limits to what the civil society is able to reach even 
in formally liberal regimes, as the openness of the political elite for reform 
depends on the potential consequences of compliance with the rule of law. The 
more it threatens the integrity and security of the state and undermines its power 
and legitimacy, the more it will be reluctant to allow its effective implementation 
(cf. Schimmelfennig et al., 2006: 59). 
Ukraine’s constitutional system, blended constitutional powers and oligarchised 
institutions present substantial challenges for the development of the rule of law. 
The horizontal independence and control between institutions is largely missing 
and distorted by dominance of the executive, while many domains of political life 
are subjected to rule of oligarchs, instead of rule of law. This creates space for 
lawlessness and corruption and sustains informal arrangements. Windows of 
opportunity to increase pressure by reform-oriented civil actors and media are 
therefore vital to counter these practices and to create a solid source of public 
oversight of government’s actions. 
 
 
CENTRALITY OF NORMS AND CULTURE:  
IS THERE A DEMAND FOR THE RULE OF LAW IN UKRAINE? 
The role of norms and culture has not been the mainstream in the scholarship on 
promotion of democracy or the rule of law in Ukraine. Some studies, however, 
highlight the importance of existing normative frames that significantly affect the 
success of rule of law (Burlyuk, 2015, Kleinfeld, 2012, Natorski, 2013). The underlying 
argument is that if persisting social norms undermine the rule of law, they will 
negatively affect its actual implementation. Contrarily, ‘when social norms work to 
support the rule of law, they buttress institutions, laws, and the power structure’ 
(Kleinfeld, 2012: 99). This involves cultural norms and habits in all social strata, but 
                                                                                                                                       
5  See, for example the work of Reanimation Package of Reforms www.rpr.org.ua.  
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especially among political and business elites, civil servants, and legal 
professionals, as some interviewees also pointed out. Several factors play a key 
role in determining Ukraine’s ‘normative playground’: (1) the Soviet legacy, (2) 
neo-patrimonial rules, (3) rent-seeking behaviour and (4) popular attitudes and 
generally low trust towards state institutions.  
 
 
The Soviet legacy 
Firstly, the implementation of the rule of law is undermined by the persisting 
Soviet legacy. The communist doctrine and authority distorted the law into a tool 
for the state power, and subverted the legal profession in favour of the soviet 
rule. This has led to misunderstanding of the concept of the rule of law by legal 
practitioners – Burlyuk (2015) argues that the shortcomings of introducing and 
consolidating the rule of law in Ukraine are due to incomprehension of the 
concept by legal elites in Ukraine, who still adhere to the rule by law rather to the 
rule of law. Besides the Soviet indoctrination of the legal system, the absence of 
proper legal education also deforms the practice of legal specialists (Fedorchuk, 
2007; OSCE, 2009). According to one interviewee, the very narrow and positivistic 
teaching of law in Ukrainian universities neglects the complex knowledge and 
understanding of the law based on independent and critical thinking and global 
standards of work with sources.6 Moreover, it is the problem of mentality and low 
political culture that does not foster independence and morality of legal experts. 
The lack of professional lawyers’ standards plays important role in insufficient 
professional and moral equipment of Ukrainian lawyers, causing weak sense of 
independence and accountability (USAID, 2016). 
 
 
Neo-patrimonialism  
The impartiality and accountability of the judicial domain is especially proble-
matic area of the rule-of-law reform in Ukraine. Natorski (2013) argues that 
judicial development needs to be understood comprehensively, with regard to 
the sociological roots of clientelism that has traditionally characterised the 
                                                                                                                                       
6  Interview with USAID official, Kyiv, 16 August 2016.  
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judiciary in Ukraine. The political clientelism of the Soviet political system has laid 
foundations for modern neo-patrimonial structures in independent Ukraine. Neo-
patrimonial rule7 is considered to be one of the organizing principles of the 
political system in Ukraine, in which informal institutions and relations dominate 
over formal ones (Fisun, 2012 and 2015; Stewart, 2013). The patrimonial system is 
founded on the client-patron ties, personal loyalty, and clan membership, while 
the aim of political competition and participation is to capture positions in the 
government and the state apparatus to control and extract sources of rents. This 
affects the formation and work of political parties, appointments to public offices, 
and the structuring of relations among political actors and businesses at the 
national and regional level. Fisun (2015) therefore characterises Ukraine as a “neo-
patrimonial democracy”, in which multiple patron-client oligarchic networks 
compete through formal electoral mechanisms, but their primary driver is still 
rent-seeking and rent-extracting.  
 
 
Rent-seeking behaviour  
The rent-seeking behaviour is one of the prevailing norms among the political 
and business elite, which determines the rules of the game and obstructs the 
progress in transparent and fair competition. These practices have in fact helped 
to create the wealth of major oligarchs in the 1990’s and a large informal 
economy, which forms around 40% of Ukraine’s GDP (UNIAN, 2016). Disrupting 
this system by thorough application of the rule of law bringing transparency, fair 
competition and criminal liability for wrong-doings would mean disruption of 
well-established patron-client networks and endanger their wealth and vested 
interests.8 Apart from manipulation of the rules of the market and the 
monopolisation, the corruption is one of most evident manifestation of rent-
seeking behaviour. It has affected every part of Ukraine’s economy, state and 
                                                                                                                                       
7  For original conceptualisation of (neo)patrimonialism see Max Weber (1978) Economy and 
Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology and Shmuel N. Eisenstadt (1973) Traditional 
Patrimonialism and Modern Neopatrimonialism. 
8  An example of blocking the reform could be the system of e-declarations of assets of public 
officials that was supposed to be launched in mid-August 2016. However, as this would constitute 
an ‘atomic bomb’ (as put by one interviewee) for many officials, the launch was postponed several 
times and technically blocked. In Verkhovna Rada, there were several proposals to curb the 
effective implementation of the system. For details see Sukhov, 2016. 
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society. The corrupt practices have constituted the ‘normal’ between citizens, in 
citizens’ relation to the state and it has even determined the rules by which the 
state has been run. Ukraine’s political system is therefore best described as state 
capture (De Waal, 2015), or, an oligopoly.9  
 
Popular attitudes of low trust 
Despite the fact that many Ukrainians reject corrupted practices of political and 
economic elites, one interviewee reported that these were possible thanks to a 
‘tacit arrangement between Ukrainian state and society pretending normalcy’ (‘we let 
you do you business and you will not raise energy prices and taxes’).10 These 
systemic shortcomings are both affected and sustained by the general attitudes 
to the law, apathy and scepticism towards the state in an atmosphere of mistrust 
rooted in the Ukrainian society. Firstly, the institutional and generalised trust in 
Ukraine tend to be rather low. Ukrainians display low levels of trust towards the 
majority of public institutions: in 2015, only 5% of Ukrainians trusted the judiciary, 
8% prosecutors, 8% Verkhovna Rada, 9% the government and 19% the president 
(USAID, 2016).11 Prior to the Revolution of Dignity, the level of trust in courts was 
one of the lowest in the world (16%) and the lowest among the former soviet 
countries (Rochelle and Loschky, 2014). The low level of confidence to public 
institutions is, however, partly a reflection of low level of trust among citizens 
themselves, as illustrated by the results of the European Social Survey (Burlyuk, 
2015). As a vicious circle, low trust in the society makes people more likely to turn 
to informal networks and practices and rely on the personal ‘F-connections’ of 
finance, firms, friends, families, and favourites (Dinello, 1999) in order to facilitate 
their economic and social transactions. If informal rules guide the socially 
acceptable behaviour, they undermine the rule of law (Kleinfeld, 2012). Moreover, 
Burlyuk (2015) argues, that the perception of law as a social regulator among 
Ukrainians is not obvious. For many, the desirable social norms do not coincide 
with the law, what questions the legitimacy of the law as such. 
                                                                                                                                       
9  Interview with UNDP official, Kyiv, 22 August 2016. 
10  Interview with UNDP official, Kyiv, 22 August 2016. 
11  See also recurrent sociological polls by Razumkov Centre, 
http://www.razumkov.org.ua/eng/socpolls.php and by Gallup Polls: 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/187931/ukrainians-disillusioned-leadership.aspx  
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The identified factors undermining the rule-of-law reform in Ukraine are very 
much interwoven and mutually supportive: the Soviet legacy and predominance 
of other norms, such as clientelism and neo-patrimonialism, result in omnipresent 
corruption and nurture ambivalent attitudes towards the law and even low 
demand for the rule of law, which could harm existing profitable ties. They point 
at further need to research the complex social and cultural background and 
persisting everyday practices to understand the absence of the rule of law in 
Ukrainian political, social and economic life. 
 
  
CONCLUSION: IMPLICATIONS FOR RESEARCH OF DOMESTIC REFORM 
AND THE POWER OF EXTERNAL ACTORS  
This paper presented the paradox of the development of rule of law in Ukraine – 
despite external support for the rule-of-law reform, Ukraine is not a state guided 
by the rule of law in many domains, especially in division of powers and inter-
institutional independence, effective and fair judiciary and deeply entrenched 
corrupted practices. It underlined two under-researched aspects complementary 
to institutional or legal analysis of the rule of law – the role of power and 
normative environment. These factors shed light both on reasons of protracted 
and superficial implementation of the rule of law in Ukraine by looking at less 
formal and visible areas of reform. This has implications for studying both the 
domestic developments and the role of external actors in supporting them.  
The political and cultural environment, country-specific power structures and 
patterns of political, social and economic behaviour need to be studied more 
thoroughly in order to reveal the working of informal power structures and the 
normative domestic environment that influence the practices of implementation 
of the rule of law. Research about persisting practices (see Adler & Puliot, 2011) 
implies looking under the iceberg of the institutional structures and examining 
cultural and often inarticulate foundations of everyday behaviour contradicting 
the rule of law. 
The overview of structural political and cultural factors limiting the rule-of-law 
reform in Ukraine bears implications also for understanding the EU’s efforts to 
promote the rule of law. Firstly, the success of EU’s actions depends on the level 
of understanding of domestic power structures and introduction of relevant 
incentives when the windows of opportunity open. Thorough knowledge of 
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domestic environment enables to select the right actors to work with, since the 
engagement of the local stakeholders is vital for a sustainable change. Secondly, 
the informal institutions affect the potential impact of external actors. They 
decrease transparency of the decision-making processes, and make it harder for 
external actors to understand the complexity of domestic relations. In addition, 
the domestic actors can instrumentally refer to a formal logic and deny the 
influence of particularistic interests, and thus deprive external actors of 
arguments in favour of reform (Stewart, 2013). Thirdly, achievements of external 
actors, such as the EU, are contingent on existing normative frames in the 
domestic environment. The ‘change of minds’ by bottom-up reform through 
engagement with the civil society, educational institutions and developing 
people-to-people contacts are a necessary part of a successful reform. These 
conclusions open space for further research of ability of the external actors to 
understand the complexity and specificity of the domestic environment and to 
adjust their strategy. 
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